# 1NC

### bell hooks K

#### The affirmative relies on binary thinking that homogenizes the locus and cause for suffering – the USFG’s military actions are always deplorable, the debate community and framework only work in one, oppressive direction –

#### This ensures the failure of resistance and develops a culture of victimization that recreates imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy which is the foundation of all oppression

Hooks 12, Distinguished Professor in Residence at Barea

(Bell, Writing Beyond Race: Living Theory and Practice, pg. 43)

Clearly the future of diversity lies in creating greater awareness and greater critical consciousness about the importance of ending domination, of challenging and changing white supremacy. Riane Eisler urges in her partnership model that we shift from an us-versus-them attitude to a worldview where we place the “same standards of human rights and responsibilities provided by the partnership model to all cultures.” She contends: “In a world where technologies of communication and destruction span the globe almost instantaneously, creating a better world is a matter of enlightened self-interest.” Now more than ever we need to create learning communities that make learning the theory and practice of diversity essential aspects of curriculum. In my recent book Teaching Critical Thinking: Practical Wisdom, I call attention to the way in which issues of diversity both inside and outside the classroom are slowly being pushed back into the realm of silence and misinformation. As I wrote: “More than ever before, students need to learn from unbiased perspectives, be they conservative or radical. More than ever before, students and teachers need to fully understand differences of nationality, race, sex, class, and sexuality if we are to create ways of knowing that reinforce education as the practice of freedom.” Learning to challenge and change binary thinking – the us-and-them paradigm – is one way to create a foundation that can be sustained. Holding onto binary thinking actually keeps dominator culture in place, for one aspect of that culture is the projection outward onto an enemy, an “other,” whenever things go wrong, and this casting of blame in turns helps to promote a culture of vicitimization. When we are more energized by the practice of blaming then we are by efforts to create transformation, we not only cannot find relief from suffering, we are creating the conditions that help keep us stuck in the status quo. Our attachment to blaming, to identifying the oppressor stems from the fear that if we cannot unequivocally and absolutely state who the enemy is then we cannot know how to organize resistance struggle. In the insightful book Ruling Your World: Ancient Strategies for Modern Life, Mipham Rinpoche talks about learning to understand others rather than blaming them. He shares: “I remember my father and other of the older generation of Tibetan lamas saying that they did not blame the Communist Chinese for the destruction of Tibet. They felt that blaming the Chinese would not solve anything. It would only trap Tibetans in the past.” Similarly, any critical examination of the history of the civil rights struggle in the United States will show that greater progress was made when leaders emphasized the importance of forgiving one’s enemies, working for reconciliation and the formation of a beloved community, rather than angry retaliation. Casting blame and calling for vengeance was an aspect of militant movements for black power that have really failed to sustain the climate of unlearning racism previously forged by nonviolent anti-racist struggle. In the aftermath of sixties rebellion, the more black folks were encouraged to vent rage, to “blame” all white folks for race-based exploitation and domination, and to eschew any notion of forgiveness, the more an internalized sense of victimhood became the norm. Tragically, today many black folks are more despairing of any possibility that racism can be effectively challenged and changed than at other similar historical moments when white supremacist aggression was more overtly life threatening. Unenlightened white folks who proclaim either that racism has ended or that they are not responsible for slavery engage in a politics of blame wherin they disavow political reality to insist that black folk are never really victims of racism but are the agents of their own suffering. Dualistic thinking, which is at the core of dominator thinking, teaches people that there is always the oppressed and the oppressor, a victim and a victimizer. Hence there is always someone to blame. Moving past the ideology of blame to a politics of accountability is a difficult move to make in a society where almost all political organizing, whether conservative or radical, has been structured around the binary of good guys and bad guys. Accountability is a much more complex issue. A politics of blame allows a contemporary white person to make statements like, “My family never owned slaves,” or “Slavery is over. Why can’t they just get over it?” In contrast, a politics of accountability would emphasize that all white people benefit from the privileges accrued from racist exploitation past and present and therefore are accountable for changing and transforming white supremacy and racism. Accountability is a more expansive concept because it opens a field of possibility where in we are all compelled to move beyond blame to see where our responsibility lies. Seeing clearly that we live within a dominator culture of imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy, I am compelled to locate where my responsibility lies. In some circumstances I am in a position to be a victimizer. If I only lay claim to those aspects of the system where I define myself as the oppressed and someone else as my oppressor then I continually fail to see the larger picture. Any effort I might make to challenge domination is likely to fail if I am not looking accurately at the circumstances that create suffering, and thus seeing the larger picture. After more than thirty years of talking to folks about domination, I can testify that masses of folks in our society – both black and white – resist seeing the larger picture.

#### Orienting resistance against imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy is a critical means of naming interlocking systems of oppression in which we are both victim and victimizer. This is critical to the creation of agency and the resistance of dominator thinking

Hooks 12, Distinguished Professor in Residence at Barea

(Bell, Writing Beyond Race: Living Theory and Practice, pg. 43)

When I first began to use the phrase imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy to characterize the interlocking systems that shape the dominator culture we live within, individuals would often tell me that they though it was just too harsh a phrase. In the past ten years, when I’ve used the phrase at lectures, more often than not audiences respond with laughter. Initially, I though this laughter was an expression of discomfort, that the true nature of our nation’s politics were being exposed. But as the laughter followed me from talk to talk I began to see it as a way to deflect attention away from the seriousness of this naming. Time and time again critical theory has taught us the power of naming accurately that which we are challenging and hoping to transform. But one way to silence accurate naming is to make it appear ridiculous, too strident, too harsh. Rarely am I asked the value of calling attention to interlocking systems of domination. Yet when we examine the cultural circumstances that provided the groundwork for facscism in the twentieth century (looking particularly at the roots of fascism in Germany, Spain, and Italy), we find similar traits in our nation (i.e., patriarchial, nationalistic, racist, religious, economic power controlled by a minority in the interests of wealth, religion, etc.). In fascist regimes, teaching populations to fear “terrorism” is one way the system garners support. Concurrently, dissident voices challenging the status quo tend to be silenced by varied forms of censorship. Most recently in our nation, the use of media to suggest that anyone who criticizes government is a traitor deserving of condemnation and even arrest effectively silences many voices. Meaningful resistance to dominator culture demands of all of us a willingness to accurately identify the various systems that work together to promote injustice, exploitation, and oppression. To name interlocking systems of domination is one way to disrupt our wrongminded reliance on dualistic thinking. Highlighted, these interlocking systems tend to indict us all in some way, making it impossible for any of us to claim that we are absolutely and always victims, calling attention to the reality of our accountability, however relative. When we are accountable, we eschew the role of victim and are able to claim the space of our individual and collective agency. For many folks, especially those who are suffering exploitation and/or oppression, that agency may seem inadequate. However, asserting agency, even in small ways, is always the first step in self-determination. It is the place of hope.

### PIC

#### We advocate the entirety of the affirmative without their use of the term “ableism” – Instead, understanding oppression experienced surrounding disability should conceptualize it as “disablism” – breaks the connection between discrimination and ability

Chapman 10, Professor of Social Work at York University

(Christopher S., Crippling narratives and disabling shame: disability as a metaphor, affective dividing practices, and an ethics that might make a difference, still.my.revolution.tao.ca/node/68)

I used to use the term "ableism" to describe oppression against people who are labeled as disabled and/or the idea that disabled people are not as good as to non-disabled people. Within the past year or so, however, I have begun using the word "disablism" instead. There are a lot of reasons for this, but the primary one is the fact that ableism implies that this oppression is somehow related to ability – which it is not. Disability is a social category and its label is imposed on certain groups of people because of their perceived characteristics as un(der)productive. Internationally, disablism is the more commonly used term and, it is my understanding, ableism is really used only in North America and Australlia. The reason for this, I believe, is the way the disability rights movement emerged in each country. In the U.K., the emphasis was on the construction of disability and how people were disabled by social barriers. In the U.S. the focus was rights. There are, however, some folks in the United States who do use disablism exclusively or who use them both. When I began writing and speaking about disability, I used the term ableism; that is what I had been exposed to living in Canada. I didn't question the term and when, years later, I began to learn about the (British) social model I just thought it was one of those word differences that we have across the pond, like tampon and fanny pack or cigarette and fag. I only began to appreciate the intentional usage of “disablism” in the past few years. Then, one day, a non-disabled friend of mine was chatting about how someone at her work was being (dis/)ableist. But, she didn't say that, what she said was "what about ability?" That was when I realized that using ableism makes it really easy for people to equate ablesim with discrimination based on ability. This is a very problematic association. That is why I started using disablism rather than ableism to describe disabled people's oppression. Lisa, author of Lizy Babe's Blog, writes: "If 'racism' is discrimination on the grounds of race, surely it is logical that the word for discrimination on the grounds of disability would be 'disablism'?" She goes on to argue that "'ableism' is derived from the medical model of disability - the idea that a disability is something we have, that we are disabled by a lack of ability." I also think it is easier for those who use the term ableism to talk about able-bodied people, but this too is very problematic. The opposite of disabled is not able-bodied for a number of reasons. Firstly, "able-bodied" describes a physical state. Many people can be disabled and able-bodied at the same time as there are a number of different aspects of disability, not solely physical disability. What then, within this linguistic logic would you call people who are not psychiatized and don't have intellectual disabilities? Able-brained? Able-minded? I am offended by my invention of these words and can't imagine them being used. Also in the realm of the physical is the fact that able-bodied is adopted from a medical model, as I have already said, disability is not about "the body" of an individual, it is about the social categorization of certain kinds of people. Lastly, the idea that there are people who are able-bodied and not able-bodied is very troubling. Everyone has an "able body." Our bodies are what keep us alive, what sustain us – disabled or not. Words like "paralysis" and "disabled" are often used in disablist ways to talk about full stops but this is far from the way disabled people live our lives. If someone becomes disabled, their life continues and their body, while different (and possibly even painful or frustrating) is what allows their life to continue. Chris Chapman writes: In fact, we could imagine a less ableist account of literal paralysis – perhaps – as being more in line with what Kris describes: if I was to literally lose mobility in my legs today, my life won’t stop, but I’ll be fundamentally changed in enormous ways that I could never anticipate beforehand. It’s only ableism (sic) that situates paralysis as signifying only immobility in every aspect of life.\* We all have able bodies. If we don't have able bodies we are dead – otherwise our bodies are working, they are able. The opposite of disabled is not able-bodied, it is non-disabled. Of course, the use of the term dis/Abled also contributes to the idea that disability is about ability. This particular term is used by some very well meaning disabled people and supporters. It is written this way to encourage people to focus on our abilities. However, the problem for disabled people is not a branding issue, it is oppression. The fact that women have proven that they are as smart and capable as men hasn't changed the reality that women still make roughly 70% of what men make (something that has changed little in several decades). And, to show what women are equally as competent as men, they don't feel the need to call themselves wo/Men. While dis/Abled often comes from a well intentioned place, it is individualistic and it falsely connects disability with ability which actually works to reinforce our oppression, not the other way around.

#### Use of the term ableism blocks effective resistance to discrimination

Egan 08

(Lisa, Disablism Vs. Ableism, lisybabe.blogspot.com/2008/05/disablism-vs-ableism.html)

Those of you who don't know, "ableism" is the American/Australian word for "disablism". And I think it's ludicrous. For one thing it reminds me of those ridiculously over-PC words like "handicapable" or "differently abled", which are only used by people who are trying to pretend that disability doesn't exist. Secondly, it's unclear what it actually means. If "disablism" is discriminating against people for being disabled, surely "ableism" is discriminating against people for being able? In season three, episode 18 of My Name Is Earl, Earl and Randy go into a "wheelchair bar". In this bar there are no chairs, so it's obviously discriminating against people who are able to walk thus haven't brought their own seat with them. That's what I would call "ableism". In reality, in the UK it is illegal to discriminate against someone for being disabled, but it is legal to discriminate against someone for not being disabled. So for example, it is legal to advertise a job as being for disabled applicants only. This I would also call "ableism" (though I don't think this is wrong). Someone on an Internet message board I use started a discussion on ableism. She was Australian, and angered that she had tried to introduce a non-disabled person to the concept of ableism. The non-disabled person laughed at such a ludicrous term. Obviously I did too, because it's a silly word. But this person laughed, because she didn't believe that such a thing existed. I wonder if she would have still laughed if Australians used the more accurately descriptive word "disablism". On that thread several people mentioned that they struggle to get non-disabled people to understand concepts of ableism. I never have any trouble getting people to understand disablism; could this be because of the language I use? I believe that calling disablism "ableism" is akin to calling racism "whiteism". I've heard some people disagree, and argue that grammatically "ableism" is more correct. I fail to see their point. If "racism" is discrimination on the grounds of race, surely it is logical that the word for discrimination on the grounds of disability would be "disablism"? I shall await the barrage of comments from people who have studied the English language in greater depth than me pointing out why I'm an idiot. So my appeal for this Blogging Against Disablism Day is for us all to call disablism what it really is. If we are using a word like "ableism" which tries to pretend that disability doesn't exist, how can we fight against discrimination on the basis of disability? If we're trying to pretend that disability doesn't exist, then how can discrimination on the basis of it exist? "Sexism", "racism" and "homophobia" are used by English speakers the whole world over. How are we supposed to expect non-disableds to fully understand concepts of disablism if we can't even come up with a unified word for it? Say it with me people: Diss-A-Buh-Lism. Then go and read what my cat had to say for BADD. Edit May 8th: Thanks for all the comments on this post. I was especially interested by the thoughtful comment by maudite entendante in which she said: Highly Obvious to me that the "abl-" in "ableism" is just the prefix form of "ability" (because, really, "abilityism" just isn't a possible English word), and it means "discrimination based on [amount or type or category of] ability" Looking at the term "ableism" in that context makes it clear that "ableism" is derived from the medical model of disability - the idea that a disability is something we have, that we are disabled by a lack of ability. I'm a believer in the social model of disability, the idea that we are disabled by barriers which prevent us from living as full and equal citizens. The term "disablism" doesn't have such obvious medical model roots. Another reason why I think this term is superior.

### War DA

#### The aff’s blanket condemnation of war prevents successful continuation of the war against terrorists

Zuckerman et al 12 – research associate @ Heritage

(Jessica, with Michaela Bendikova – research assistant @ Douglas Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Lisa Curtis – Senior Research Fellow @ Asian Studies Center, Eleven Years Later: U.S. Should Not Lose Momentum in the War on Terrorism, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/counterterrorism-strategy-us-should-not-lose-momentum-in-war-on-terrorism)

Last year, in the run-up to the 10th anniversary of 9/11, the Obama Administration released its new National Strategy for Counterterrorism.[1] Under the new strategy, the Administration seeks to treat terrorism under (1) a law enforcement paradigm that failed to protect Americans from terrorism when it was adopted by the Clinton Administration before 9/11 and (2) a “small footprint” policy for overseas operations. Following this strategy threatens to cede momentum in the war on terrorism and augment the terrorist threat against the U.S.¶ One year later, the U.S. counterterrorism strategy remains flawed. The U.S. needs to name its enemies, maintain the nation’s commitments abroad, fully fund the military, reach out to allies, and truly defend the home front.[2]¶ Terrorist Safe Havens and Commitments Abroad¶ In April, the U.S. and Afghanistan concluded a landmark Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) laying a broad framework for relations between the two nations after the U.S. and NATO withdraw combat troops by the close of 2014. While the SPA does not specify future U.S. funding amounts or troop levels, it does offer a broad U.S. commitment to support Afghanistan financially and bolster democratic institutions and civil society through 2024. It also provides a framework for the U.S. to maintain a residual presence to train Afghan forces and conduct counterterrorism missions.¶ While the SPA helps to demonstrate a continued diplomatic and financial commitment to Afghanistan, racing to remove combat troops from the country before the mission is accomplished could precipitate a civil war and lead to conditions that allow al-Qaeda to re-establish its base there.¶ The U.S. needs to clarify its goals in Afghanistan and be more consistent in its messaging to Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, continues to serve as a safe haven for terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Taliban, and the Haqqani network, threatening to jeopardize everything the U.S. has fought for in Afghanistan since 9/11. The U.S. should put forward terms for the U.S.–Pakistan relationship and make it clear that Pakistani failure to cooperate with the U.S.-led strategy in Afghanistan and to take action against terrorist sanctuaries within its borders will result in decreased U.S. military aid and diplomatic engagement. The Administration’s recent decision to declare the Haqqani network a foreign terrorist organization is a step in the right direction.¶ The U.S. should also continue to use drone strikes as necessary. The Administration’s stepped-up drone campaign in Pakistan’s tribal border areas, for example, has helped to disrupt al-Qaeda operations and planning. Drones are a highly effective counterterrorism tool, but they should be part of a broader strategy that includes uprooting extremist ideologies that support terrorism, collecting information from captured terrorists, and convincing the Pakistanis to conduct joint operations that deal with the threat.¶ The State of the Military and U.S. Missile Defense¶ A year later, sequestration looms nearer. If Congress does not act, on January 2, 2013, across-the-board cuts will go into place. For the defense budget, this means additional half-trillion-dollar cuts on top of the large defense reductions that have already taken place. The Department of Defense has absorbed a $400 billion cut (called “efficiencies”) under former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Current Secretary Leon Panetta has had to cut over $400 billion pursuant to the Budget Control Act of 2011.¶ The defense budget has already absorbed about half of all spending cuts even though it represents less than a fifth of the federal budget. If the Obama Administration continues to weaken U.S. forces, the country will be unable to maintain its superpower status.¶ As the U.S. withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan, the world is not becoming a safer place. Iran and North Korea continue to invest in capabilities designed to kill Americans and their allies. Syria is wracked by civil war and has the potential to destabilize the entire Middle East. The world order relies on the U.S. being able to project its stabilizing presence. Yet President Obama’s current policies are undermining the very capabilities that make power projection possible.¶ The U.S. should adopt a “protect and defend” strategy with a mix of offensive (conventional and nuclear) and defensive (active and passive) forces. Despite the increasing spread of ballistic missile technologies, the Administration has proposed a woefully inadequate missile defense budget and has canceled some of the most promising missile defense programs, including the Multiple Kill Vehicle, Airborne Laser, and Energy Kinetic Interceptor.¶ The U.S. remains the only nuclear-armed country without a substantive nuclear weapons modernization program. President Obama’s policy is preventing the U.S. from developing a nuclear arsenal capable of threatening what state sponsors of terrorism value: their own survival and means of threatening their neighbors and oppressing their citizens.¶ Protecting the Homeland¶ In the past year, at least six Islamist-inspired terrorist plots aimed at the U.S. have been thwarted, bringing the total number of terrorist plots foiled since 9/11 to at least 51.[3] The fact that the U.S. has not seen a large-scale successful attack since 9/11 truly speaks to the successes of the nation’s law enforcement and counterterrorism enterprise. More, however, can be done to strengthen these efforts.¶ Despite the persistent threat of terrorism, the Administration continues to treat it under a law enforcement paradigm that focuses on reactive policies and prosecuting terrorists rather than proactive efforts to enhance intelligence tools and thwart terrorist attempts long before the public is in danger. This strategy fails to recognize the true nature of the threat posed by terrorist groups (such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab) and state-sponsored terrorism.¶ U.S. leadership should also recognize that thwarting terrorist travel and financing remains the most effective way to protect the homeland. On the one hand, this means expanding programs such as Secure Flight and the Visa Waiver Program, which allow citizens of member countries to travel to the U.S. for up to 90 days without a visa and also help to prevent terrorists and other dangerous travelers from entering the U.S. by pre-screening passengers and requiring greater information sharing between the U.S. and member countries.¶ At the same time, the U.S. should also create a lawful detainment framework for the incapacitation and lawful interrogation of terrorists to ensure that valuable and necessary intelligence can be obtained. This should be coupled with efforts to preserve existing counterterrorism and intelligence tools, such as the PATRIOT Act. Ensuring that U.S. counterterrorism and law enforcement officials have vital intelligence is essential to thwarting terrorist plots.¶ The Future of America’s Counterterrorism Strategy¶ It has been 11 years since the tragedy of 9/11. While the U.S. has made great strides, the threat of terrorism has not yet abated. Both at home and abroad, America needs an enduring and sustainable counterterrorism enterprise capable of responding to future emerging threats.

#### Now is key to stop terrorists – Al Qaeda is at a transitional moment

McLaughlin 13 (John McLaughlin was a CIA officer for 32 years and served as deputy director and acting director from 2000-2004. He currently teaches at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, ¶ 06:00 AM ET¶ Terrorism at a moment of transition7/12, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/12/terrorism-at-a-moment-of-transition/)

A third major trend has to do with the debate underway among terrorists over tactics, targets, and ways to correct past errors.¶ On targets, jihadists are now pulled in many directions. Many experts contend they are less capable of a major attack on the U.S. homeland. But given the steady stream of surprises they’ve sprung – ranging from the 2009 “underwear bomber” to the more recent idea of a surgically implanted explosive – it is hard to believe they’ve given up trying to surprise us with innovations designed to penetrate our defenses.¶ We especially should remain alert that some of the smaller groups could surprise us by pointing an attacker toward the United States, as Pakistan’s Tehrik e Taliban did in preparing Faizal Shazad for his attempted bombing of Times Square in 2010.¶ At the same time, many of the groups are becoming intrigued by the possibility of scoring gains against regional governments that are now struggling to gain or keep their balance – opportunities that did not exist at the time of the 9/11 attacks.¶ Equally important, jihadists are now learning from their mistakes, especially the reasons for their past rejection by populations where they temporarily gained sway.¶ Documents from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, discovered after French forces chased them from Mali, reveal awareness that they were too harsh on local inhabitants, especially women. They also recognized that they need to move more gradually and provide tangible services to populations – a practice that has contributed to the success of Hezbollah in Lebanon.¶ We are now seeing a similar awareness among jihadists in Syria, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. If these “lessons learned” take hold and spread, it will become harder to separate terrorists from populations and root them out.¶ Taken together, these three trends are a cautionary tale for those seeking to gauge the future of the terrorist threat.¶ Al Qaeda today may be weakened, but its wounds are far from fatal. It is at a moment of transition, immersed in circumstances that could sow confusion and division in the movement or, more likely, extend its life and impart new momentum.¶ So if we are ever tempted to lower our guard in debating whether and when this war might end, we should take heed of these trends and of the wisdom J. R. R. Tolkien has Eowyn speak in “Lord of the Rings”: "It needs but one foe to breed a war, not two ..."

Disabled bodies are unwillingly forced into carrying out terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda turning case

BBC News, 2008

[2/1/08, “Twin bombs kill scores in Baghdad,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\_east/7221639.stm]

Attack aftermath More than 70 people have been killed by two bombs in Baghdad, attached to two mentally disabled women and detonated remotely, says a security official. "The al-Qaeda terrorists and criminals are proud of this method," Brig Qassem Ata al-Moussawi told the BBC. The death toll in Friday morning's attacks at two animal markets was the highest in months in Baghdad. Correspondents say a fragile sense of normality had returned to the capital following an influx of US troops. Security has improved significantly since the US implemented its troop "surge" in the second half of 2007. A ceasefire announced in August by the Mehdi Army militia of Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr, as well as the emergence of local Sunni militia armed by the US military that took on al-Qaeda in Iraq, have also contributed to the sense of security. Figures released by Iraqi ministries on Friday suggested that the number of civilians and security forces killed across Iraq in January - 541 - was the lowest monthly total for nearly two years. Confidence shattered But that renewed confidence could be shattered by Friday's deadly bombings, the worst to hit the Iraqi capital since three car bombs killed 80 people last 1 August. “ The operation was carried out by two booby-trapped mentally disabled women ” Brig Qassem Ata al-Moussawi Iraqi security forces spokesman The blasts came shortly before the call to Friday prayers when many Iraqis were out shopping or meeting friends. The first device was detonated by a female suicide bomber at around 1020 local time (0720GMT) in the popular Ghazil animal market, killing at least 46 people and injuring a further 80. A popular spectacle for Baghdadis, the animal market only opens on Fridays and regularly draws large crowds, despite having been targeted by bombers twice in 2007. Just 20 minutes after the first explosion, a second bomb tore through another crowded market in the Jadida area of east Baghdad, killing at least 27 people and injuring 67. PREVIOUS GHAZIL MARKET BOMBS June 2006 - Four killed by two bombs left in bags Dec 2006 - Three killed in mortar attack 26 Jan 2007 - 15 killed by bomb hidden in box of birds 23 Nov 2007 - 13 killed in attack blamed on Iranian-backed Shia militants Iraqi security forces spokesman Brig Moussawi told the BBC: "The operation was carried out by two booby-trapped mentally disabled women. [The bombs] were detonated remotely. "Forensic and bomb squad experts as well as the people and traders of al-Shorja area of the carpet market have confirmed that the woman who was blown-up there today was often in the area and was mentally disabled... "In the New Baghdad area the shop owners and customers of the pet market confirmed that the woman who was blown-up there was mentally disabled as well." The US ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, said al-Qaeda had found a "different, deadly" technique. "There is nothing they won't do if they think it will work in creating carnage and the political fallout that comes from that," he said. Police and medical officials piled the dead and injured into wheelbarrows, cars and the back of pick-up trucks to be transported to five hospitals across the city. An official at the capital's Kindi hospital said at least 30 bodies had been received. "We have a disaster here," he said. "There are too many bodies to count."

#### Terrorists can easily acquire nuclear weapons- an attack would trigger full scale nuclear war

Speice ‘6

(Patrick F. Jr.-, J.D. Candidate @ Marshall-Wythe School of Law, B.A. @ Wake, Feb., William & Mary Law Review, “Negligence and Nuclear Nonproliferation: Eliminating the Current Liability Barrier to Bilateral U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Assistance Programs”, Lexis)

Although no terrorist acts directed against the population or interests of the United States or other states have been launched with nuclear weapons yet, this failure "must be assumed to be due to lack of means rather than lack of motivation." Attempts by al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear material are well documented, and several other attempted thefts of nuclear material indicates that there is a demand for nuclear material among terrorist groups, many of which are hostile to the United States.

The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically increased the risk that terrorist organizations will succeed in acquiring fissile material from Russia for several reasons. First, the end of the Soviet state marked the end of state control over every aspect of life in the Soviet Union. 34 One by-product of stringent centralized control was heavy regulation and intense security measures for military facilities and nuclear installations. 35 Second, the economic decline that accompanied the transition to a market economy 36 exacerbated the problem, as the fiscal situation in the former Soviet states, most notably [\*1437] Russia, made security programs impossible to fund. 37 Graham Allison summarizes the implications of post-Soviet disorder in Russia:

The dramatic changes ... have produced political uncertainty, economic distress, and social dislocation. For tens of millions of Russians, hardship and deprivation are inescapable facts of life... [H]arsh economic conditions can create incentives for nuclear theft and smuggling. For people who are poorly housed, poorly fed, and poorly paid (when paid at all), there will be a temptation to do what they can to improve their lives and secure their futures. Russia's nuclear custodians face these pressures as they preside over weapons and materials that are immensely valuable to any state or group that covets nuclear weapons. It is not

hard to imagine that people leading bleak, uncertain, and difficult lives might find irresistible the prospect of wealth and security via the nuclear black market...

Organizations such as the Russian military and Minatom are now operating in circumstances of great stress. Money is in short supply, paychecks are irregular, living conditions unpleasant ... [D]isorder within Russia and the resulting strains within the military could easily cause a lapse or a breakdown in the Russian military's guardianship of nuclear weapons. 38

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39

Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44

Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48

The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [\*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53

#### A nuclear terror attack turns their impacts – causes government intervention and re-entrenches oppression

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin ‘12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html

The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause violent protests in the Muslim world. Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability. BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order. All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

### **Case**

**Focus on the body as a site for excludes hidden disabilities – that recreates oppression**

Mollow 4, Anna, PhD candidate in English at the University of California, Berkeley. IDENTITY POLITICS ANDDISABILITY STUDIES:A CRITIQUE OF RECENT THEORY quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0043.218;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mqrg

The most troubling aspect of **Thomson's** use of identity politics is her **definition of disability as visible physical difference.** Extraordinary Bodies locates "the disabled people of the later twentieth-century" at the end of a historical trajectory that begins with "the wondrous monsters of antiquity" and moves to "the fascinating freaks of the nineteenth-century" (58). Undoubtedly, many of the people who appeared in nineteenth-century freak shows might today be described as disabled. But other nineteenth-century constructions that have little to do with visual bodily difference—such as **the hysteric or the invalid**—**are** also **important** **to consider in a history of disability**. **Thomson**, however, **tends to equate disability with visible difference. She writes that "the disabled body is a spectacle** . . . in a complex relation between seer and seen" (136). In literature, she claims, disability "functions only as a visual difference"; and throughout history, female "deviance" is "always attributed to some visible characteristic" (10-11; 28; emphasis added)

**I do not** mean to **suggest that Thomson would** **deny that** many **people with invisible impairments are disabled**; on the contrary, like each of the critics I discuss in this essay, Thomson is committed to combating oppression of people with all forms of disability. In fact, early in the first chapter of her book, she provides a definition of disability that includes a number of non-visible impairments (13). **Yet Thomson does not explain** in Extraordinary Bodies **how her definition of disability as a visual spectacle might be reconciled with her recognition of arthritis as a disability, or** with the ADA's inclusion of conditions such as **carpal tunnel syndrome, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, hypertension, and chronic back pain under the category of disability**. [24] **Thomson's unintentional elision of invisible** **disability has** potentially **serious political repercussions**; **people with unseen disabilities are often objects of suspicion and disbelief**. [25]

**Thomson's narrow definition of disability does not result from a wish to exclude**, **but rather from the use of an identity politics model**. Critics of identity politics point out that **the construction of identity is an inevitably exclusionary process;** one defines who one is in part by saying what one is not, thus **producing** what Butler has called **a "constitutive outside**" (xi). In Extraordinary Bodies, this constitutive outside might be understood as disease. **Thomson's construction of a positive disabled identity is facilitated by her emphatic disassociation of disability from disease.** She seeks "to recast [disability] from a form of pathology to a form of ethnicity" (6). The title of her conclusion—"From Pathology to Identity"—repeats the call for such a transition in understanding disability.

#### The body does NOT come first – a rich disabled individual has it a lot better off than a less affluent one – they erase difference

**Boys 8** (Jos, “challenging the 'normal': towards new conceptual frameworks”, http://www.sowhatisnormal.co.uk/challenging)

Of course, the standard array of Others – under-class/women/black and ethnic minority/homeless/disabled are of as many different sorts as are ‘non-others’; but just as with the essentialist binary divisions of male/female normal/abnormal the concept of Other in post-modernity is all too often also cut-off from the social and material relations of each individual’s diverse existence. As Ahmed says, we are not all other in the same way.

Why is this a pr

oblem? It means that people located in the category of other are elided together as equivalent in their marginality. This avoids dealing with the social, cultural and political processes by which disadvantaged groups are differently framed as ~~invisible/over-visible~~. It enables real and inequitable differences between others (between well-paid academics and a homeless person for example) to somehow be blurring into a pretence of sameness. And it avoids the difficulties and complexities of context, personalities, life histories and geography – which all can ‘undo’ a elegant theoretical conceit – to remain concealed.

# 2NC

#### The affirmative’s focus on personal narratives and experiences creates a therapeutic model of debate that merely counsels the individual victims of oppression. This locates the cause of problems and solutions within the self, which invites political inaction and leaves structural causes of oppression untouched as long as we have adopted their method [found survival strategies for blackness, opened debate up for inclusion of alternative perspectives, etc.]. This effectively absolves intellectuals of responsibility for racism while allowing it to thrive.

Tonn 5 – assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland

(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by therapy also enables political inaction in two respects. First, an open-ended process lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution. As Freeman writes of consciousness raising, an unstructured, informal discussion [End Page 418] "leaves people with no place to go and the lack of structure leaves them with no way of getting there."70 Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the self as both problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual agency. "Therapy," Cloud argues, "offers consolation rather than compensation, individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action." Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she claims, "locates blame and responsibility for solutions in the private sphere."71¶ Clinton's Conversation on Race not only exemplified the frequent wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic themes but also illustrated the failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to achieve meaningful social reform. In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said, "Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . . Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin." Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel" racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit."72¶ Following the president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens chiefly aired personal experiences and perspectives during the various community dialogues. In keeping with their talk-show formats, the forums showcased what Orlando Patterson described as "performative 'race' talk," "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even apology, in short, performances of "self" that left little room for productive public argument.73 Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities" Clinton also had promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence.¶ Whereas Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue" in the name of "responsibility" and "community," Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional," he writes, "contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium." More to the point, "a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of 'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister function, from the standpoint of overall-social necessities."74 Frustrated observers of the racial dialogue—many of them African Americans—echoed Burke's concerns. Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. There was nothing to argue about."75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. Jackson invoked the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither exhaustive racial data nor concrete goals. "The game," wrote Jackson, "is to get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it."77

#### This means the affirmative actively provides fuel to the fire of hegemonic debate practices. As long as the community provides an avenue for self-expression, the issue is resolved. This actively discourages structural solutions to problems of inequality because it makes narrative as a sufficient remedy.

Tonn 5 – assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland

(Mari, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside itself."39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, "[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction."40¶ Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the "self-help" on which much therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black [End Page 412] poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims, all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves.

#### The affirmative methodology prioritizes discussions of who holds knowledge rather than what the content of that knowledge is. This makes us more concerned with interrogating social location than working for justice for others. This leads to authenticity challenges and endless searches for purification of identity that preclude effective political strategies. Their focus on the self leads to a shrinking of the moral imaginations that limits politics to what is immediately connected to our personal identities. This standpoint can and should be challenged.

Moore 99 – prof @ Cambridge

(John, with Johan Muller, University of Cape Town “The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education,” British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p. 199-200)

The pedagogic device (Bernstein, 1990) of voice discourse promotes a methodology in which the explication of a method's social location precludes the need to examine the content of its data as grounds for valid explanation. Who says it is what counts, not what is said. This approach favours an ethnography that claims to reveal the cultural specificity of the category--the 'voice' of membership. What is held to be the facts, to be the case, is only so-and can only be so-from a particular perspective. The world thus viewed is a patchwork of incommensurable and exclusive voices or standpoints. Through the process of sub-division, increasingly more particularised identity categories come into being, each claiming the unique specificity of its distinctive experience and the knowledge authorised by it. ¶ The consequence of the abolition of the knowledge boundary that follows from the epistemological theses of postmodernism is the increasing specialisation of social categories (see Maton, 1998). Maton describes this process of proliferation in terms of the way such 'knower' discourses, ¶ ... base their legitimation upon the privileged insight of a knower, and work at maintaining strong boundaries around their definition of this knower-they celebrate difference where 'truth' is defined by the 'knower' or 'voice'. As each voice is brought into the choir, the category of the privileged 'knower' becomes smaller, each strongly bounded from one another, for each 'voice' has its own privileged and specialised knowledge. The client 'knower' group thus fragments, each fragment with its own representative ... The procession of the excluded thus becomes, in terms of the privileged 'knower', an accretion of adjectives, the 'hyphenation' which knower modes often proclaim as progress. In summary, with the emergence of each new category of knower, the categories of knowers become smaller, leading to proliferation and fragmentation within the knowledge formation. (ibid., p. 17) ¶ As Maton argues, this move promotes a fundamental change in the principle of legitimation-from what is known (and how) to who knows it. ¶ The device that welds knowledge to standpoint, voice and experience, produces a result that is inherently unstable, because the anchor for the voice is an interior authenticity that can never be demonstrated, only claimed (Taylor, 1992; Siegel, 1997; Fuss, 1990, 1995). Since all such claims are power claims, the authenticity of the voice is constantly prone to a purifying challenge, 'If you do not believe it you are not one of us' (Hammersly & Gomm, 1997, para. 3.3) that gears down to ever more rarefied specialisations or iterations of the voice category; an unstoppable spiral that Bernstein (1997, p. 176) has referred to as the 'shrinking of the moral imagination [10]. ¶ As Bernstein puts it, 'The voice of a social category (academic discourse, gender subject, occupational subject) is constructed by the degree of specialisation of the discursive rules regulating and legitimising the form of communication' (1990, p.23). ¶ If categories of either agents or discourse are specialised, then each category necessarily has its own specific identity and its own specific boundaries. The speciality of each category is created, maintained and reproduced only if the relations between the categories of which a given category is a member are preserved. What is to be preserved? The insulation between the categories. It is the strength of the insulation that creates a space in which a category can become specific. If a category wishes to increase its specificity, it has to appropriate the means to produce the necessary insulation that is the prior condition to its appropriating specificity. (ibid.) ¶ Collection codes employ an organisation of knowledge to specialise categories of person, integrated codes employ an organisation of persons to specialise categories of knowledge (Bernstein, 1977, pp. 106-111). The instability of the social categories associated with voice discourse reflects the fact that there is no stable and agreed-upon way of constructing such categories. By their nature, they are always open to contestation and further fragmentation. In principle, there is no terminal point where 'identities' can finally come to rest. It is for this reason that this position can reappear so frequently across time and space within the intellectual field-the same move can be repeated endlessly under the disguise of 'difference'. In Bernstein's terms, the organisation of knowledge is, most significantly, a device for the regulation of consciousness. ¶ The pedagogic device is thus a symbolic ruler of consciousness in its selective creation, positioning and oppositioning of pedagogic subjects. It is the con- dition for the production, reproduction, and transformation of culture. The question is: whose ruler, what consciousness? (1990, p. 189) ¶ The relativistic challenge to epistemologically grounded strong classifications of knowledge removes the means whereby social categories and their relations can be strongly theorised and effectively researched in a form that is other than arbitrary and can be challenged by anyone choosing to assert an alternative perspective or standpoint.

#### The affirmative strategy is willful refusal to discuss issues that are not personally related to them. This call for us to ignore the resolution is problematic because it focuses our politics on justice at “home” and “in our communities.” This has several implications. First it reproduces the idea of our communities as a home, which actively creates exclusions of the foreign other. Second, it orients our politics around correcting the injustices that happen to be geographically close to us. Why is the indefinite detention of Blacks and Latinos in prisons more important than Guantanamo? Why is the targeted killing of youth by cops more important than the targeted killing of foreigners by drones? Because those are issues that are close to us? This argument collapses on itself and creates a deliberate excuse for ignoring international atrocities by focusing on what matters to us, right here and right now.

Sunstrom 8 – Associate Professor of Philosophy

[2008, Ronald R. Sunstrom is a black Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Francisco; additionally, he teaches for USF's African American Studies program and the Master of Public Affairs program for the Leo T. McCarthy Center of Public Service and the Common Good. He was awarded the 2008 Sankofa Faculty Award from USF's Multicultural Student Services, USF's 2009 Ignatian Service Award, and was a co-winner of the 2010 USF Distinguished Teaching Award. His areas of research include political theory, critical social and race theory, and African American and Asian American philosophy, “The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice”, pp. 65-92]

Yet social justice is not to be found in the questionable safety of nostalgia for the traditional racial and ethnic patterns of the United States. Nostalgia for what could be called traditional racial and ethnic patterns leads too easily to nativism and isolationism. Although demographic changes do not erase the nation’s obligations to address long-existing claims for social justice, neither do those obligations give the nation reasons to ignore its moral and political obligations to other groups, such as immigrants and refugees. It would be odd and troubling for the nation to merrily work toward justice at “home,” all the while neglecting the demands of those whom the nation regarded as perpetual foreigners (and not really being at “home” in the nation) and the demands of global justice. Such a vision of justice is self-serving and morally hollow. Long-existing civil rights claims should not delimit the nation’s moral boundaries and its conception of civil rights, thus ipso facto severing them from internationally determined human rights. The reactions of some citizens to the browning of America, unfortunately, open up this possibility, which is yet another evasion of social justice.7 When I broach these issues, or any of the particular issues discussed in this book, the response I frequently receive is that these issues are red herrings that divert our attention away from the real enemy, that of white supremacy.8 I am dubious about this complaint; after all, focusing on “white supremacy” does not directly address the particulars of the interethnic conflicts that arise from the browning of America. Perhaps, though, these critics mean that we should focus on how “white supremacy,” in the form of institutionalized racism or white power, divides minority groups, so as to conquer them and leave them to fight over a limited set of resources. Alternatively, these critiques would have us focus on how Latinos, Asian Americans, Americans who identify as multiracial, and immigrants adopt anti-black racism and the privileges of whiteness as they assimilate into American society. I think the latter argument is bogus, and chapter 3 is devoted in part to explaining why. As for the former, I think “white supremacy” is too broad and vague a category to be helpful, and that focusing on such a flawed category of power can be positively harmful. Such moves simply sidestep the particular issues that are raised in interethnic conflicts and may even contribute to the evasions I outlined earlier. The people of the United States, as they experience and participate in the browning of America, should resist both types of evasions. The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice argues, in contrast, that the people of the United States should see in its demographic change the transformation of social justice. They should welcome that transformation and view it as an opportunity to satisfy old debts and expand in a cosmopolitan direction the very idea of social justice.

#### Autonomous subjectivity bad – turns case

Zhao, professor of education, 12 – Associate Professor in the College of Education at Oklahoma State University (Guoping, Ph.D. from the University of Virginia, 3/30-4/1/12, “Freedom Reconsidered: Heteronomy, Infinity, and Open Subjectivity,” Annual Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, http://www.philosophy-of-education.org/uploads/papers2012/Zhao.pdf)

Since the time of Heidegger, the problems of the humanist construction of the sovereign subject have been exposed and analyzed. Even though it is a point of debate whether the subject has been, especially in Foucault and Derrida‘s works, ―eliminated‖ or ―liquidated,‖ there is no question that several attempts have been made to reassemble and reconstitute it, even after its deconstruction (Peters, 2009). What is remarkable in these critiques and reconstructions of the subject is that the modern notion of freedom, freedom as autonomy, which is born out of and closely associated with the humanist subject, has remained essentially intact. In fact, it seems to be a common sentiment among modern and postmodern thinkers that great care has to be taken so that the pursuit of human freedom is ensured at all times. Thus postmodern thinkers often ask, in the process of deconstructing the subject, to what extent is freedom still possible? Or, how can we ensure human freedom without the human subject? In this context, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut suggest that the search for a ―nonmetaphysical humanism‖ has to involve ―conferring a coherent philosophical status on the promise of freedom contained in the requirements of humanism‖ (1990, p. xxviii, emphasis in the original). Freedom is universally assumed and never put into question. Such an ―incontestable right‖ to pursue freedom, as Levinas notes, is the ―dominant tradition of Western philosophy‖ (PII, p. 57). If there is any concern about such a pursuit, the concern is always about the scope, the extent of freedom, but not about the legitimacy, the very idea of freedom.¶ But Levinas maintains that the notion of freedom as autonomy is tied to an ego-centered, self-enclosing subject and is very part and parcel of the humanist subject. A new approach to subjectivity has to involve a reconsideration of the notion of freedom. In critiquing the Western tendency to build the human subject centrally on ego and consciousness and in working out a radically different approach to human subjectivity, Levinas proposes freedom as heteronomy. Drawing on Levinas, I will analyze how an insistence on and passion for the modern notion of freedom has limited and undermined the reconstruction of human subjectivity in Heidegger and Foucault and how a new understanding of human freedom allows us to envision an open, transcendental subjectivity.1 Since the notions of human subject and freedom are so central to modern education, I will discuss the profound implications such reworking has for educational theories and practices.¶ Freedom as Autonomy and the Humanist Subject¶ Within the Western philosophical tradition, freedom has almost always been posited as something good in and of itself. All philosophy, Schelling once said, is a search for freedom: ―the begining and end of all philosophy is—Freedom‖ (cited in Perpich, 2001, p. 307). Freedom is not to be questioned, and ―its limitation alone is held to be tragic and to constitute a scandal‖ (Levinas, TI, p. 83). However, when freedom is understood as autonomy, it implies an agent, or a subject, and autonomy means the agent‘s freedom to take control of his life and realize his foundational purposes—the noble idea of self-mastery and self-realization. Thus autonomy is closely associated with an ontological assertion of being. In modern times, since Descartes, the trajectory of Western philosophy has made the ―‘I‘ of the person‖ (Levinas) the first principle, and in German philosophy through Kant and Hegel in particular, autonomy has been elevated to such a level that the transcendental, godlike being‘s free will reigns over the world. Levinas describes such a situation: ―[it was] as though I had witnessed the creation of the world, and as though I could only have been in charge of a world that would have issued out of my free will‖ (OB, p. 122).¶ But Levinas argues that in this understanding of freedom, self becomes ―an egotism of the I and exhibits a solipsistic attitude where ―every power begins‖ (PII, p. 50). When the “I think” is allowed to be the first principle, “the soul conversing with itself” (PII, p. 49) dominates and stops the process of the soul‘s going beyond what is already in its nature. Since ego is that which totalizes the diverse events of the subject to make continuity and identity possible, it is a movement of essence where the self is lost in an ideal principle. ―Freedom will triumph when the soul‘s monologue will have reached universality, will have encompassed the totality of being, encompassing even the animal individual which lodged this thought‖ (Levinas, PII, p. 49). The modern subject is deadened in this freedom and its particularity negated. In addition, ―in the philosophical life that realizes this freedom, there arises a term foreign to the philosophical life, ‘other‘ …. It becomes an obstacle; it has to be surmounted and integrated into this life‖ (Ibid.). In front of this all-encompassing subject, the Other has to be comprehended, absorbed, and possessed. Thus freedom is ―the reduction of the other to the same‖ (PII, p. 48). In this situation, everyone‘s freedom excludes every other‘s freedom and everyone‘s freedom limits every other‘s freedom. This is the situation of a ―war of each against all‖ (OTO, p. 190).¶ The arbitrariness and the egoistic feature of individual autonomy are not unknown in Western philosophy, and in fact, autonomy is typically conceived as necessarily complemented by a higher constraint, either as general will (Rousseau) or universal reason (Kant). In political and social philosophy, positive freedom (freedom as autonomy) is thought of as achieved essentially through a collectivity, and thus carries with it the shadow of authoritarianism. John Wild remarks that in Western philosophy, it has been widely held that escaping from egoism ―can be achieved only by a jointed sacrifice of self to a neutral, englobing system‖ in which only the neutral and impersonal is important (1969, p. 14). In this system, to be free means ―to be rational, and to be rational is to give oneself over to the total system that is developing in world history‖ (Ibid., p. 15). The ego is suppressed by neutral rationality and a large domain of human experiences is dismissed.¶ The problem with the notion of autonomy is that the optimistic idea comes with a solemn understanding that the violent and egoistic self cannot be left free but has to be tamed. To uphold the noble idea of self-mastery and self-realization, then, the self has to be idealized and partially admitted, or to be divided into two selves: the ideal, higher, rational and the lower, irrational, and empirical (Berlin, 1969). Autonomy is reserved only for the rational, the higher, self but never meant for the lower self. It is expected that when endowed with autonomy, the higher self will act in accordance with the ideal, the good, and the predicated. The lower self, however, is meant to be restrained. Thus as human beings, we are facing the paradox of freedom and domination at the same time in the name of autonomy. Further, within humanity, it could also be conceived that some groups are more rational and therefore deserve more freedom and some are less rational and should submit themselves to the other groups. This slippery slope can lead to all kinds of oppression and domination. Kant‘s kingdom of ends, for example, even though meant for the whole of humanity, can only serve those rational ones who submit to impersonal universal reason. All the sensible, the particular, the emotional and empirical human experiences are negated in the universal and rational. This is the irony of autonomy and this is why Levinas comments that ―Humanism has to be denounced only because it is not sufficiently human‖ (OB, p. 128).

#### The affirmatives silence on the question of nonviolence should be considered an intentional act that the permutation severs. Their omission from the 1AC makes it impossible for them to access our counter history and ensures a move towards violence as per our 1NC Dumhoff card

Medina 11 – prof @ Vanderbilt

(Jose, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism, Foucault Studies, No. 12, pp. 9-35, October 2011)

In the second place, by undoing established historical continuities, a counter- history reflects and produces discontinuous moments in a people’s past, gaps that are passed over in silence, interstices in the socio-historical fabric of a community that have received no attention. This is what we can call, by symmetry with the pre- vious point, the principle of discontinuity. Foucault describes it in the following way:¶ This counter-history “also breaks the continuity of glory.” It reveals that the light—the famous dazzling effect of power—is not something that petrifies, solidifies, and immobilizes the entire social body, and thus keeps it in order; it is in fact a divisive light that illuminates one side of the social body but leaves the other side in shadow or casts it into darkness.13¶ A counter-history is the dark history of those peoples who have been kept in the shadows, a history that speaks ‚from within the shadows,‛ ‚the discourse of those who have no glory, or of those who have lost it and who now find themselves, perhaps for a time—but probably for a long time—in darkness and silence.‛14 A counter-his- tory is not the history of victories, but the history of defeats. As Foucault remarks, it is linked to those ‚epic, religious, or mythical forms which “formulate the misfortune of ancestors, exiles, and servitude;‛ it ‚is much closer to the mythico-religious discourse of the Jews than to the politico-legendary history of the Romans.‛15 While an official history keeps entire groups of peoples and their lives and experiences ‚in darkness and silence,‛ a counter-history teaches us precisely how to listen to those silent and dark moments. But how do we learn to listen to silence? In an earlier essay, ‚What is an Author?,‛16 Foucault offers helpful remarks about how to fight against the ‘omissions‛ and active oblivion produced by discursive practices, that is, how to listen to lost voices that have been silenced or coopted in such a way that certain meanings were lost or never heard. Foucault is particularly interested in those forms of silencing produced by a discursive practice which, far from being accidental, are in fact foundational and constitutive. Those are constitutive silences, for the discursive practice proceeds in the way it does and acquires its distinctive normative structure by virtue of the exclusions that it produces, by virtue of those silenced voices and occluded meanings that let the official voices and meanings dominate the discursive space. Omissions and silences are foundational, a constitutive part of ‚the origin‛ or ‚the initiation‛ of a discursive practice. For that reason, the fight against those exclusions requires ‚a return to the origin‛:¶ If we return, it is because of a basic and constructive omission that is not the result of accident or incomprehension.” This non-accidental omission must be regulated by precise operations that can be situated, analyzed, and reduced in a return to the act of initiation.17¶ Foucault distinguishes this critical ‚return to the origin‛ from mere ‚rediscoveries‛ and mere ‚reactivations‛: a rediscovery promotes ‚the perception of forgotten or obscured figures;‛18 and a reactivation involves ‚the insertion of discourse into totally new domains of generalization, practices, and transformation.‛19 By contrast, an attempt to transform a discursive practice deeply from the inside by resisting its silences and omissions requires a ‚return to the origin.‛ This critical return involves revisiting the texts that have come to be considered foundational, ‚the primary points of reference‛ of the practice, and developing a new way of reading them, so as to train our eyes and ears to new meanings and voices: we pay ‚particular attention to those things registered in the interstices of the text, its gaps and absences. We return to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed in a false and misleading plenitude.‛20 Foucault emphasizes that the modifications introduced by this critical return to the origin are not merely ‚a historical supplement that would come to fix itself upon the primary discursivity and re- double it in the form of an ornament which, after all, is not essential. Rather, it is an effective and necessary means of transforming discursive practice.‛21 If rediscoveries and reactivations of the past are crucial for extending discursive practices, a ‚return to the origin‛ that unveils omissions and silences is what is required for a deep transformation of our meaning-making capacities within those practices. The ability to identify omissions, to listen to silences, to play with discursive gaps and textual interstices is a crucial part of our critical agency for resisting power/knowledge frame- works. Lacking that ability is a strong indication of one’s inability to resist epistemic and socio-political subjugation, of the limitations on one’s agency and positionality within discursive practices. And the ability to inhabit discursive practices critically that we develop by becoming sensitive to exclusions—by listening to silences— enables us not to be trapped into discursive practices, that is, it gives us also the ability to develop counter-discourses. Indeed, being able to negotiate historical narratives and to resist imposed interpretations of one’s past means being able to develop counter-histories. Becoming sensitive to discursive exclusions and training ourselves to listen to silences is what makes possible the insurrection of subjugated knowledge: it enables us to tap into the critical potential of demeaned and obstructed forms of power/knowledge by paying attention to the lives, experiences and discursive practices of those peoples who have lived their life ‚in darkness and silence.‛

# 1NR

Al-Qaeda is becoming increasingly reliant on unwilling disabled suicide bombers

CRIN, 2012

[8/15/12, Child Rights International Network, “IRAQ: AL-QAEDA RECRUITING INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES FOR SUICIDE ATTACKS,” http://crin.org/en/library/news/iraq-al-qaeda-recruiting-individuals-mental-disabilities-suicide-attacks]

[15 August 2012] - Iraqi security officials said al-Qaeda in Iraq is largely resorting to recruiting individuals [with mental disabilities] to carry out suicide operations because potential young recruits are refusing to join the organisation. "Thirty per cent of the recent suicide bombings were conducted by individuals who are mentally challenged or are suffering from psychological disorders," said Col. Hikmat Mahmoud al-Masari, director of media and public relations at the Interior Ministry. "They did not know or were unaware of what they were doing when al-Qaeda sent them to detonate in the middle of crowds of people," he added. "Intelligence reports confirm that al-Qaeda is now using mentally challenged [people] because of a serious shortage of suicide bombers in its ranks," al-Masari said. "This is the result of increased security measures at the borders, the decline in the number of foreign terrorists entering Iraq and the disinterest of citizens, especially the young, to listen to slogans and calls from terrorist leaders because they no longer believe in them," al-Masari said.

*War turns structural violence*

*Goldstein 1—Prof PoliSci @ American University, Joshua, War and Gender , P. 412*

*First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice". Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression/" The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.*

#### be suspicious of their “master variable”, authors exaggerate problems their programs have the best chance of solving

Barnett et al 7

Michael, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell, Laura Sitea, Global Governance, “Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?”, Questia

Because there are multiple contributing causes of conflict, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any perceived or real grievance can arguably be called "peacebuilding." Moreover, anyone invited to imagine the causes of violent conflict might generate a rather expansive laundry list of issues to be addressed in the postconflict period, including income distribution, land reform, democracy and the rule of law, human security, corruption, gender equality, refugee reintegration, economic development, ethnonational divisions, environmental degradation, transitional justice, and on and on. There are at least two good reasons for such a fertile imagination. One, there is no master variable for explaining either the outbreak of violence or the construction of a positive peace but merely groupings of factors across categories such as greed and grievance, and catalytic events. Variables that might be relatively harmless in some contexts can be a potent cocktail in others. Conversely, we have relatively little knowledge regarding what causes peace or what the paths to peace are. Although democratic states that have reasonably high per capita incomes are at a reduced risk of conflict, being democratic and rich is no guarantor of a positive peace, and illiberal and poor countries, at times, also have had their share of success. Second, organizations are likely to claim that their core competencies and mandates are critical to peacebuilding. They might be right. They also might be opportunistic. After all, if peacebuilding is big business, then there are good bureaucratic reasons for claiming that they are an invaluable partner.

#### Their description of “structural violence” is flawed – it overdetermines a single line of causality, but lacks the specificity to describe likely scenarios – prefer our empirical impact claims

Thompson 3

William, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of International Relations at Indiana University, “A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(3), AD: 7-10-9

Richard Ned Lebow (2000–2001) has recently invoked what might be called a streetcar interpretation of systemic war and change. According to him, all our structural theories in world politics both overdetermine and underdetermine the explanation of the most important events such as World War I, World War II, or the end of the Cold War. Not only do structural theories tend to fixate on one cause or stream of causation, they are inherently incomplete because the influence of structural causes cannot be known without also identifying the necessary role of catalysts. As long as we ignore the precipitants that actually encourage actors to act, we cannot make accurate generalizations about the relationships between more remote causation and the outcomes that we are trying to explain. Nor can we test the accuracy of such generalizations without accompanying data on the presence or absence of catalysts. In the absence of an appropriate catalyst (or a ‘‘streetcar’’ that failed to arrive), wars might never have happened. Concrete information on their presence (‘‘streetcars’’ that did arrive) might alter our understanding of the explanatory significance of other variables. But since catalysts and contingencies are so difficult to handle theoretically and empirically, perhaps we should focus instead on probing the theoretical role of contingencies via the development of ‘‘what if ’’ scenarios

### calc

#### Even if you think there’s a link discussion of existential risk and its prevention is important in comparison to structural concerns – this also answers their meta-uniqueness arguments

\*\*\*people shouldn’t be valued more just because they exist close to us in time

Bostrom, 2012 (Mar 6, Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,” interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in D.C., <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.